Russia Equivalent of NATO Crumbling Amid Failures in Ukraine War

• Putin’s military alliance is beset by new tensions following Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine.
• Some member states have snubbed Putin, have declined to offer support, or have turned to the West.
• CSTO, Russia’s equivalent of NATO, was never a powerhouse, but relations have become more strained.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has his own version of the NATO military alliance, made up of post-Soviet states.

But the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which was never as powerful or cohesive as Russia would have liked, has been increasingly creaking since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, experts told Insider.

Some of its members have made unprecedented public snubs against Putin, and experts say they are conscious of Russia’s poor military performance over the past year, with questions over how well Russia could protect them.

Some may even fear becoming future Russian targets.

Jaroslava Barbieri, an expert in Russia and post-Soviet states at the University of Birmingham, told Insider that the CSTO is “almost like an attempt to imitate NATO, but in the post-Soviet space.”

But, she said, it’s now “really showing cracks.”

Snubs from allies

As Putin has become more isolated since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, CSTO members have made up some of his few remaining allies, with close cultural, historical, and military ties, and economies that heavily rely on Russia.

In addition to Russia, the CSTO consists of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, all once part of the Soviet Union.

But some have committed a series of apparent snubs against Putin since the invasion began.

These include Tajikistan’s president demanding more respect, despite his country’s small size, in front of Putin in October; Kazakhstan looking for closer ties with the West, and denying Russia’s request to send troops at the start of the invasion; and Armenia’s prime minister criticizing the effectiveness of the CSTO to Putin’s face and physically distancing himself from Putin at an alliance members’ leaders group photo in November.

Other snubs included Kazakhstan sending aid to Ukraine, Armenia and Kazakhstan voting in favour of a UN resolution that noted the “aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine” in April 2023, and Armenia turning to France for help with a regional conflict, after being frustrated by the CSTO’s response.

Peter Frankopan, an expert on Russian and Balkans history at Oxford University, told Insider that the countries seem visibly unhappy with Russia: “It is certainly true that Putin looks like his status has been downgraded.”

And Frankopan said the apparent snubs appear calculated. “It is bold; but it is not done without thought or care. It would not seem to me unreasonable to suppose that there have been detailed backroom discussions,” he added.

Putin wants his own NATO

Putin has positioned NATO as his biggest enemy, justifying the brutal invasion of Ukraine in part by saying he was trying to stop its expansion toward Russia’s borders.

Ironically, the invasion has only strengthened NATO, with nearby Finland joining, effectively doubling the length of the Russia-NATO border.

One of NATO’s key tenants is the idea of collective defence: If one member is attacked, it is as if all are.

The CSTO has a similar agreement. But the workings of the CSTO cast doubt on whether it could ever reasonably compete with NATO.

In September 2022, Armenia called on CSTO for help during border clashes with Azerbaijan. The alliance limited its response to sending its secretary-general and offering to form a working group.

Armenia’s prime minister called the response “depressing” and said it was “hugely damaging to the CSTO’s image both in our country and abroad.”

REUTERS/Didor Sadulloev

Poor protections

That response was part of a pattern.

Anais Marin, an expert on Russia and Belarus and an associate fellow at Chatham House, told Insider that Armenia not getting the military assistance it asked for only “further discredited the organization.”

She noted Armenia subsequently cancelled planned in-country CSTO drills in January 2023.

Marin also noted that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan “tested, and evidenced, the limits of the CSTO when the alliance declined to intervene” in September 2022 border clashes between the countries, in which more than 100 people died.

“Member states appeared as unwilling to offer military support,” she said, adding that Russian peace-keeping troops, not CSTO ones, were deployed to secure the cease-fire.

University of Birmingham’s Barbieri said that the lack of CSTO response had likely led Armenia to a rethink.

“I would say that there are very serious conversations going on inside Armenia whether they should remain a member of the CSTO at all,” she said.

And Marin said that there was tension among the CSTO even before the invasion of Ukraine.

She described Armenia as “a very close ally of Russia,” one that is “extremely dependent on Russia both economically and in terms of military security.”

But, she said, it has had a “noticeable growth in distrust towards the Kremlin” in recent years, and has “developed quite some resentment against Russia for what it perceives amounted to failing to help a friend in need” during fighting with Azerbaijan in 2020.

The value of the organization has also been criticised by Kyrgyzstan for an even longer time, she added.

And Frankopan said that countries had likely stopped trusting Russia’s military abilities. “I think most states learned not to think about Russia as a protector state,” he said.

Russia’s military struggles in Ukraine have only fueled doubts.

Worse relations since the Ukraine invasion

Russia expected to conquer Ukraine in days. Instead, more than a year later its army is bogged down in the east, hemorrhaging soldiers and equipment as its reputation plummets.

Barbieri said Russia’s regional reputation as a security provider “is in tatters.”

She added that the invasion of Ukraine was the last straw “in the sense that Russia is seen no longer as providing security, but as a destabilizer, spoiler, of security in the region.”

Marin suggested that the CSTO had become “a marginal actor in the eyes of most of its member states already before the war, but it further lost its relevance throughout 2022.”

She said the invasion resulted in “fear, and growing distrust towards the Kremlin” — except in Belarus, which is widely seen as a Russian puppet state, and has helped in the invasion.

She added that it’s “noteworthy that Russia did not ask for CSTO support at any stage of its ‘special military operation.'”

Marin also said that CSTO members don’t seem interested in taking big risks to protect the alliance’s future.

“Should Russia be militarily defeated in Ukraine, the CSTO is unlikely to survive,” she said.

Russia a ‘toxic partner’

According to Frankopan, regional backlash to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could be happening for multiple reasons, including ideological objections to Russia’s brutal tactics.

But he and Marin said tensions also likely stem from self-interested fears and frustrations: that they too could become targets, as well as how the invasion has made everyday life harder.

Frankopan noted that pro-Kremin figures have suggested on state TV the annexation of parts of Kazakhstan, and the war has driven up energy and food prices.

Marin said the Ukraine invasion had made Russia a “rather toxic partner” to most of its post-Soviet neighbours.

And CSTO members are also dealing with an influx of Russia immigrants fleeing military call up, she said.

Even so, while other post-Soviet countries have aligned themselves closely with the West and NATO, CSTO members remain tangled with, and to some extent dependent on Russia, with no formal split likely.

Barbieri noted that “there will still be pragmatic alliances” between the nations.

Marin went further. She said the alliance is losing relevance and legitimacy in the eyes of most of its members, but that Russia will retain its influence.

“It would be wrong to assume that Russia is losing ground in its post-Soviet neighbourhood, Moscow retains multiple means to exert considerable leverage in most of these countries’ domestic affairs,” she said.

Frankopan also said that dissatisfaction with Russia could easily change. “This pendulum can swing in both directions, and in the right or wrong conditions, policy can be adapted or even reversed,” he said.

Meanwhile, despite international condemnation and repeated battlefield humiliations, Russia looks set to continue its war in Ukraine, and there are no signs that Putin will be removed from power.

But, Barbieri said, if the war and Putin continue as they have, Russia’s power over CSTO allies will continue to weaken.

“Its ability to be a leader in the region will become weaker and weaker and it will be surrounded more and more by other states dictating the terms to Russia and this is really not something that Putin’s regime can accept,” she said.

It was also unlikely to be the outcome Putin was looking for when he launched his invasion of Ukraine.